Here’s another posting that got lost in theOilDrum.com comment thread Deepwater Oil Spill – A Longer Term Problem, Personnel – and Open Thread 2

I’ve corrected a few factual errors, and those corrections will appear in […] in the quote body, and I’ve also cleaned up the links/quotes to make them more readable. Other than that all content is as it appeared Saturday night. Please note that the original source for this was as far as I can tell on godlikeproductions.com/forum1/ – The BP Deep water horizon, Macondo Well Blowout. and what we are facing in the Gulf Part II

A similar discussion/posting of a casing failure can be found at nakedcapitalism.com – Guest Post: BP Official Admits to Damage BENEATH THE SEA FLOOR, June 12 2010, with relevant quotes and support arguments.

Also, you have to wonder if this is what Matt Simmons (Oil Guru: The Real Nightmare Will Be When A Hurricane Picks Up The Oil And Paints The Gulf Coast Black, and theOilDrum.com – Matt Simmons on Dylan Ratigan Today, Closing the Relief Ports, and Open Thread 2) and Florida senator Bill Nelson (Sen. Bill Nelson: Reports of oil seeping up from seabed, well casing may be pierced. (video) ), were talking about recently, albeit in a distorted form?

Also please make sure to read the discussion I’ve posted under this main article/posting that looks at some of the key points from a technical perspective.

dougr on June 13, 2010 – 3:17am Permalink | Subthread | Comments top

OK let’s get real about the GOM oil flow. There doesn’t really seem to be much info on TOD that furthers more complete understanding of what’s really happening in the GOM.

As you have probably seen and maybe feel yourselves, there are several things that do not appear to make sense regarding the actions of attack against the well. Don’t feel bad, there is much that doesn’t make sense even to professionals unless you take into account some important variables that we are not being told about. There seems to me to be a reluctance to face what cannot be termed anything less than grim circumstances in my opinion. There certainly is a reluctance to inform us regular people and all we have really gotten is a few dots here and there…

First of all…set aside all your thoughts of plugging the well and stopping it from blowing out oil using any method from the top down. Plugs, big valves to just shut it off, pinching the pipe closed, installing a new bop or lmrp, shooting any epoxy in it, top kills with mud etc etc etc….forget that, it won’t be happening..it’s done and over. In fact actually opening up the well at the subsea source and allowing it to gush more is not only exactly what has happened, it was probably necessary, or so they think anyway.

So you have to ask WHY? Why make it worse?…there really can only be one answer and that answer does not bode well for all of us. It’s really an inescapable conclusion at this point, unless you want to believe that every Oil and Gas professional involved suddenly just forgot everything they know or woke up one morning and drank a few big cups of stupid and got assigned to directing the response to this catastrophe. Nothing makes sense unless you take this into account, but after you do…you will see the “sense” behind what has happened and what is happening. That conclusion is this:

The well bore structure is compromised “Down hole”.

That is something which is a “Worst nightmare” conclusion to reach. While many have been saying this for some time as with any complex disaster of this proportion many have “said” a lot of things with no real sound reasons or evidence for jumping to such conclusions, well this time it appears that they may have jumped into the right place…

TOP KILL – FAILS:
This was probably our best and only chance to kill this well from the top down. This “kill mud” is a tried and true method of killing wells and usually has a very good chance of success. The depth of this well presented some logistical challenges, but it really should not of presented any functional obstructions. The pumping capacity was there and it would have worked, should have worked, but it didn’t.

It didn’t work, but it did create evidence of what is really happening. First of all the method used in this particular top kill made no sense, did not follow the standard operating procedure used to kill many other wells and in fact for the most part was completely contrary to the procedure which would have given it any real chance of working.
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To be honest I don’t really want to think about these possibilities too much, since they translate to an unstoppable blowout, a worst case scenario where relief wells cannot stop the flow. This is from today’s theOilDrum.com Deepwater Oil Spill – A Longer Term Problem, Personnel – and Open Thread thread.

Latest numbers I’ve seen for the recoverable (what they can pull up that is) reservoir size is about 100 to 150 million barrels (that’s about 5-7.5 days total US consumption to put it into perspective). This is what we are doing to keep driving…

Prof. Goose on June 12, 2010 – 11:25am Permalink | Subthread | Comments top

“BP Official (Hofmeister) [sic: Hofmeister is an ex Shell Oil Official, not BP!] Admits to Damage Beneath the Sea Floor” (a bit of informed conjecture…)

Washington Post – BP oil spill

Yesterday, recently-retired Shell Oil President John Hofmeister said that the well casing below the sea floor may have been compromised:

[Question] What are the chances that the well casing below the sea floor has been compromised, and that gas and oil are coming up the outside of the well casing, eroding the surrounding soft rock. Could this lead to a catastrophic geological failure, unstoppable even by the relief wells?

John Hofmeister: This is what some people fear has occurred. It is also why the “top kill” process was halted. If the casing is compromised the well is that much more difficult to shut down, including the risk that the relief wells may not be enough. If the relief wells do not result in stopping the flow, the next and drastic step is to implode the well on top of itself, which carries other risks as well.

theengineer.co.uk – BP now capturing 16k barrels/day at Deepwater Horizon
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Here’s a reasonably new anonymous sourced insider view of what probably happened to cause the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout/spill. This was posted in today’s theOilDrum.com The BP Deepwater Oil Spill – the Hurricane Season – and Open Thread comment thread.

I will try to find a more original source on this story, but for now, here’s the raw report. [Update 1: source may be gCaptain.com forums – SEDCO445 – May 31st, 2010]

Peter B. on June 10, 2010 – 12:39pm Permalink | Subthread | Comments top

The following analysis was first (?) brought to light by tvhawaii on June 4th.

The original source is from elsewhere on the web.

The original author felt the need to preserve his anonymity…. and judging by his familiarity with the event, he may have had very good reason to wish for same.

(I am NOT the author, and do not have any related information. I just thought bringing the article back to light would be of use.)

Peter B.

(Anonymous Source)

The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.

The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8″, 11 7/8″ and 9 7/8″) with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8″ X 7″ tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.

The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.

The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.
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Some disturbing images/videos just out from AP/Herald-Tribune.

First check out AP VIDEO: Scuba diving in the Gulf oil spill (Sorry, can’t embed this video here, but check it out on the left side of the lower page).

Some 40 miles out into the Gulf Of Mexico, I jump off the boat into the thickest patch of red oil I’ve ever seen. I open my eyes and realize my mask is already smeared. I can’t see anything and we’re just five seconds into the dive.

Dropping beneath the surface the only thing I see is oil. To the left, right, up and down — it sits on top of the water in giant pools, and hangs suspended fifteen feet beneath the surface in softball sized blobs. There is nothing alive under the slick, although I see a dead jellyfish and handful of small bait fish.

I’m alone because the other divers with me wouldn’t get in the water without Hazmat suits on, and with my mask oiled over and the water already dark, I don’t dive deep.

Then check out the story on Spreading oil plumes confirmed.

Not so great all in all.

Just a quick update, since I’ve heard some slightly misleading reports going around, here’s some real news about what’s going on.

The current top hat device is limited by the roughly 15k per day processing capacity of the current vessel. The limit there is the amount of gas that can be flared off per day if I understand it right.

Two additional vessels are on the way now, as eventual replacements for the Discovery Enterprise drill ship, which is what is doing the processing now.

Here’s the latest update on what’s going on today. There’s some good news hidden in here by the way, if the new production top hat works as hoped, the majority of the spill may get handled before it hits the water, but of course, if the spill worsens in flow rate, the new vessels won’t be enough. But it’s unlikely that the well will flow much over 30k barrels per day, at least not judging from the materials I’ve read so far.

BP taps Toisa Pisces for Macondo

BP will use the well testing vessel Toisa Pisces and retrofit the Q4000 to burn oil, in an effort to up its ability to handle flow from a containment system on the Macondo well, but both ships face delays before they will be ready for duty.

BP aims to be able to collect as much as 28,000 barrels per day from the well in the US Gulf with the updgrades, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen said at a press briefing.
….
BP is capturing more than 15,000 bpd through its containment system on the blown out well and is bumping up against the 18,000 bpd processing capacity of the Transocean drillship Discoverer Enterprise.

The oil tanker Massachusetts is lightering the Discoverer Enterprise as needed.

Ready
The additional capacity on the Q4000 will not be ready for about a week and the Toisa Pisces awaits a new containment system that is slated for the beginning of July.

The Q4000, which is hooked to the Macondo well through the choke and kill lines on the blowout preventer (BOP), is not expected to be ready to handle production until “late next week,” Allen said at the briefing Wednesday.
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